

The Realignment of U.S. Forces in Japan and its Impact on the Interdependent Relationship between Japan and the U.S.

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Summary

This paper considers what sort of impact the realignment of U.S. forces in Japan will have on the Japan-U.S. Alliance, and focuses particularly on the two nations' interdependent relationship. The policy of easing in Japan's burden, said to result from the realignment of U.S. forces, means that in the Japan-U.S. Alliance, which has been said to involve cooperation regarding things and people, Japan's contribution of things will be reduced. This could be seen to imply that the U.S. reliance on Japan will decline and conversely that the U.S.' power over Japan will increase, relatively speaking.

However, even if the realignment of U.S. forces in Japan results in an easing of Japan's burden of things, the various conditions which supplement that will cancel out the reduction in the U.S.' dependence on Japan, and so for the time being, the balance in the mutually dependent relationship between the U.S. and Japan is likely to be preserved.

Introduction

The Japan-U.S. Security Treaty (hereafter the Japan-U.S. Treaty) is said to be a relationship involving "cooperation regarding things and people," formed by Japan providing things (the supply of bases and contributing to the cost of stationing troops) and the U.S. providing people (troops and the formulation of strategy).¹ In other words, Japan is able to obtain cooperation on the security front by providing U.S. forces with bases and expenses, and the U.S. is able to achieve its strategy in Asia as a result of being granted bases and expenses from Japan. The Japan-U.S. Alliance is an asymmetric relationship of things and people, and consequently up to now both countries have harbored considerable doubts and dissatisfaction regarding the alliance, including the division of roles and various base problems. The second Armitage Nye Report, released by Richard L. Armitage and Joseph S. Nye in February 2007, stated that "Japan must make the alliance a more balanced relationship by contributing fully in more of the sectors needed for its own national defense"² and as this shows, even half a century after the Japan-U.S. Alliance was formed, debate over the two countries' contribution to the alliance continues.

However, the fact that the alliance has continued for around half a century indicates that both Japan and the U.S. have found varying degrees of benefit in the alliance relationship. By entering an

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¹ "Cooperation regarding things and people" is an expression of Kumao Nishimura, who negotiated the original Japan-U.S. Security Treaty as director general of the Treaties Bureau of Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

² Richard L. Armitage, Joseph S. Nye, "The U.S.-Japan Alliance: Getting Asia Right through 2020" *CSIS Report*, February 2007, p. 20.

alliance the two countries have been able to obtain military, political and economic benefits while preserving their mutually dependent relationship. Will the current Global Posture Review (GPR) of the U.S. forces and the realignment of U.S. military forces in Japan, which is conducted as part of the GPR, alter this alliance? This question comes up because the core of the U.S.' dependence in the Japan-U.S. alliance is Japan's provision of bases and its support for the cost of stationing troops, and this is the focal point of the realignment of U.S. forces in Japan. The fact that post-war Japan was able to adopt policies emphasizing its economy and rely on the U.S. in the area of security was due in a large part to this strength and advantage. However, as a result of the realignment of U.S. forces in Japan, this advantage may be diminished, and it is expected that considerable changes will also occur in the interdependent relationship between Japan and the U.S. One can surmise that this is a strong possibility, given that the base problem has always come up for discussion at turning points in the alliance thus far.³

With the above points as a background, this report will consider whether the realignment of U.S. forces in Japan will alter the Japan-U.S. Alliance, and in particular will focus on the two nations' interdependent relationship in particular.

1. An overview of the realignment of U.S. forces in Japan

The GPR is one part of a military transformation that has been and is being pursued by the U.S., and is an attempt to transform the U.S. forces' bases and troop deployments abroad, which remain in a Cold War state, into something more suited to the present strategic environment. In the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) published in September 2001, the U.S. clarified a shift in basic strategy, from a threat-based approach to a capabilities-based approach. Accompanying this, the GPR sets targets such as revising deployment arrangements so that U.S. forces can be rapidly maneuvered to deal with difficult-to-predict situations arising from rogue states, global terrorism, weapons of mass destruction and other threats, and so that military personnel (as well as their families) who have been engaged in missions offshore for long periods, including peace-keeping activities, can have their off-shore postings shortened in a bid to boost morale.⁴ In the QDR 2001, the U.S. Department of Defense called the region stretching from the Middle East to East Asia an "arc of instability," and cited it as the region that will require the most vigilance as a future conflict zone. With this arc of instability in mind, the U.S. undertook realignment with the goal of shifting from the fixed deployment of troops in allied nations to the deployment of maneuverable garrisoned troops with a high degree of readiness in order to redeploy globally and respond as needed while remaining a deterrent to enemies.

The realignment of U.S. forces in Japan was discussed in the Defense Policy Review Initiative (DPRI) that got underway from December 2002. Japan and the U.S. confirmed common strategic objectives in the Japan-US Security Consultative Committee, the so-called Two Plus Two meeting, in February 2005. In October of that year the two nations explored the roles, missions and capabilities of Japan and the U.S., and as a result of that debate created a joint document titled "The U.S.-Japan Alliance: Transformation and Realignment for the Future." This was followed by the

³ Takeshi Fukuda, "Nichibei Bouei Kyoryoku ni okeru Mittsu no Tenki – 1978 Nen Gaidorain kara 'Nichibei Domei no Henkaku' made no Dotei [Three Turning Points in Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation – from the 1978 Guidelines to the 'Transformation of the Japan-U.S. Alliance']," *Reference*, July 2006, p. 144.

⁴ The National Institute for Defense Studies ed., *Higashi Ajia Senryaku Gaikan [East Asian Strategic Review]* (National Institute for Defense Studies, 2006), p. 16.

publication of the “Japan-U.S. Roadmap for Realignment Implementation” in May 2006, the final summing up of the realignment of U.S. forces in Japan. The specific details included: 1. realignment on Okinawa (including the relocation of 8,000 troops stationed in Okinawa to Guam, and the shifting of the Futenma base to the coastline of Camp Schwab); 2. reorganization of the U.S. Army command capability (to reorganize and relocate the 1st Corps Headquarters, and coexist with the GSDF Central Readiness Force’s headquarters); 3. establishment of a bilateral, joint operations coordination center at Yokota Air Base and the return of portions of Yokota airspace (move ASDF Air Defense Command from Fuchu to Yokota; Japan and the U.S. to newly establish MD command base); 4. relocation of the Carrier Air Wing from Atsugi Air Facility to Marine Corps Air Station Iwakuni; and 5. training relocation.⁵ If these are summed up, they were an attempt to assign relative weights to bases and consolidate them, to strengthen the capabilities of important bases (Zama, Yokota, etc.) and to amalgamate with the SDF.

2. The impact of the realignment of U.S. military forces in Japan on both Japan and the U.S.

(1) Assessing the maintenance of a deterrent and burden reduction

On the occasion of the latest realignment of U.S. forces the Japanese government has at times stated that “the local burden, including Okinawa, will be reduced while maintaining the deterrent capability of the U.S. forces in Japan,” but how should these two points be assessed?

Regarding the first point, deterrence, the assessment generally seems to be that it will be maintained or strengthened. Examining Japan overall, the relocation of the transformed U.S. Army command to Camp Zama, and its coexistence with the GSDF Central Readiness Force’s headquarters will create a closer link between the U.S. 1st Corps Headquarters and the SDF, and boost readiness and operational capability. Furthermore, having the ASDF’s Air Defense Command at Yokota side by side with the U.S. Fifth Air Force Command will improve air defense and missile defense capabilities. In the same way, establishing a joint operations coordination center for U.S. forces and the SDF at Yokota, where the U.S. forces in Japan headquarters is located, will lead to stronger integration between U.S. forces and the SDF and improve situational readiness.⁶

Strictly speaking, because deterrence comes into existence based on the capabilities of the side that is doing the deterring and the degree that it is acknowledged by the side that is being deterred, it is not possible to assess deterrence without questioning how the nations and non-state actors that pose a threat and are targeted for deterrence react to and acknowledge the realignment of U.S. forces. And neither is it certain that the U.S. places value in foreign bases because they are deterrents, like it did in the Cold War era. This is because, as Kent E. Calder says, “the functions of regional control, stability and strategic deterrence from Berlin to Korea that were important up to the end of the Cold War have almost completely disappeared, and the continued existence of the bases is being supported by the need to stabilize the unstable regions of Northeast Asia and the Middle East, and to ensure security.”⁷ Since the simultaneous 9/11 terrorist attacks the role of the U.S.’ offshore bases has been

⁵ Ministry of Defense ed., *Nihon no Bouei - Heisei 19 Nen Ban* [Defense of Japan, 2007 Edition] (Gyousei, 2007), pp. 226-259.

⁶ Takashi Kawakami, “Zainichi Beigun Saihen to Nichibei Doumei [The Realignment of U.S. Military Forces in Japan and the Japan-U.S. Alliance],” *Kokusai Anzenhoshou* [International Security], Vol. 33, No. 3, (December 2005), p. 34.

⁷ Kent E. Calder (translated by Yoichi Takei), *Beigun Saihen no Seijigaku – Churyubeigun to Kaigai Kichi no Yukue* [Embattled Garrisons: Comparative Base Politics and American Globalism] (Nikkei Publishing, 2008), p. 63.

changing into staging areas and posts for supporting local anti-terrorist operations.⁸

However, as a result of the realignment of U.S. forces in Japan there is no question that the two nations' situational response will become stronger and more ready due to the strengthening in the U.S. forces' and the SDF's command functions, and the establishment of closely-linked management. Okinawa's Marines will be downsized but with them being stationed in Guam the U.S. forces' presence in the Asia-Pacific region will be maintained, and the U.S. forces' military support for Japan is likely to remain stable as well.

On the other hand, some believe the downsizing of the Marines will reduce the ability to respond to threats for the following reason:

Japan's leaders need to ask themselves whether or not the withdrawal or significant downsizing of the Marines is really a sensible choice. If the Marines are decentralized their efficiency will decline. If they are removed from a conflict spot it creates a "tyranny of distance." In other words, the time or number of days taken to respond increases, the number of transport and other flights needed increases by several thousand times, other logistical problems increase and furthermore, confusion develops in command and control.⁹

In addition, one cannot deny the argument that "The U.S. is placing too much trust in its military technological prowess. Even if transportation capacity and power projection capability have improved, it takes time to transport a large number of troops. The relevance of the static deployment of ground forces has not changed."¹⁰ In regard to this point, John J. Mearsheimer also cites "the stopping power of water" – the ocean limits the capacity for bringing in the military force of the army – and argues that the army as a land power and the mobility to transport it are important even in the nuclear age.¹¹ Alternativists such as Michael O'Hanlon, who support the limited reduction of offshore bases, also emphasize that achieving U.S. forces' strategic objectives without foreign bases would be difficult because technological problems remain unresolved.¹² O'Hanlon is skeptical about the concept of redeploying capabilities rather than military strength, such as the realignment of U.S. military forces in South Korea, and indicates that troop strength remains important.¹³

What about the other point, the reduction in Okinawa's burden? Unlike making a judgment about deterrence, which cannot be seen, the consolidation of bases, the downsizing and relocation of training areas, and the withdrawal of some troops can be tangibly assessed. Aside from the bases' land-owners and some interest groups, the relocation of around 8,000 Marines to Guam, the complete return of Futenma Air Station and Camp Kuwae, the partial return of Camp Zukeran, the return of substantial tracts of land south of Kadena airfield, and the relocation of aircraft to the mainland, among other moves will clearly reduce Okinawa's burden. However, as a result of these moves new burdens will be placed on some areas of the mainland, and when the 8,000 Marines stationed

⁸ Ibid., p. 106.

⁹ "Shippai ni Owariso na Zainichi Beigun Kichi saihen [Realignment of U.S. Forces' Bases in Japan Appears Doomed to Fail]," *Sekaishuuhou* [Global Weekly Bulletin], October 11, 2005, p. 16.

¹⁰ Interview with Mike Mochizuki by the author, (July 16, 2004 at George Washington University).

¹¹ John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, (University of Chicago, 2001), pp. 83-137.

¹² Calder, *Embattled Garrisons*, p. 323.

¹³ *Asahi Shimbun*, August 18, 2004.

in Okinawa are relocated to Guam, Japan is to share the cost. In a Japan-U.S. defense summit that took place in April 2006 an agreement was reached on costs relating to facility and infrastructure development accompanying the relocation. Specifically, that of the total cost of \$10.27 billion, the U.S. would contribute \$4.18 billion and Japan would contribute a total of \$6.09 billion, including investment and financing for family housing and infrastructure development that will be recoverable in the future, and that this would involve direct fiscal spending of up to \$2.8 billion by Japan and \$3.18 billion by the U.S.¹⁴

In the past there were no cases of Japan contributing to the cost of constructing U.S. bases within the U.S. However, for Japan the agreement on sharing the relocation costs was “an 11th-hour outcome aimed at achieving both a reduction in the local burden and maintaining a (security) deterrent,” as stated by then Chief Cabinet Secretary Shinzo Abe.¹⁵

(2) The reduction in the “Omoiyari Yosan (Host Nation Support, HNS)”

In spite of a situation in which the value of U.S. bases in Japan appears to be declining, the Japanese government is cutting back on another of Japan’s strengths in the form of its contribution to the cost of stationing U.S. troops in Japan. From 1978 Japan has been posting a so-called HNS toward the cost of stationing U.S. troops. Based on the Japan-U.S. Status of Forces Agreement and a special agreement (amended every five years from 1987 and scheduled to be extended for two years from 2007), in addition to facilities costs, Japan contributes the salaries and other labor costs of Japanese employees working on U.S. bases, the cost of constructing housing for U.S. forces’ families, water, heating and lighting expenses, the cost of constructing schools and other expenses. The size of the Japanese government’s contribution in 1978 was 6.2 billion yen, but in 1995 this had expanded to 271.4 billion yen.

According to statistics for 2004 from the U.S. Department of Defense, the U.S. spends \$60 billion or more a year to keep troops stationed offshore, and of this its allies contribute \$8.5 billion. There are 41,626 U.S. military personnel stationed in Japan and the value of support is \$4.41134 billion, or \$105,976 per head. Meanwhile, in Italy it is \$27,923 per head and in South Korea \$21,772, clearly less than Japan’s contribution.¹⁶

Table 1 shows the situation regarding the sharing of costs in nations in which U.S. troops are stationed.¹⁷ Only Japan contributes the entire cost of leasing bases, water, lighting and heating costs, the deployment of facilities and labor costs. In fiscal 2007, 217.3 billion yen was budgeted toward sharing the cost of U.S. forces stationed in Japan, and in fiscal 2008 the unofficial amount was 208.3 billion. With regard to the special agreement from April 2009, it was decided that labor costs and the cost of relocating training would be kept within the framework of the present agreement, while where water, lighting and heating costs are concerned, in fiscal 2008 Japan would contribute fuel and other expenses equivalent to around 25.3 billion yen, the same amount as in the fiscal 2007 budget, and in fiscal 2009 and fiscal 2010 it would contribute fuel and other expenses equivalent to around

¹⁴ Ministry of Defense ed., *Nihon no Bouei - Heisei 19 Nen Ban [Defense of Japan, 2007 Edition]*, pp. 246, 253. The contributions of both Japan and the U.S. were agreed upon based on estimates by the U.S. side at the deliberation stage and are strictly approximations.

¹⁵ *Yomiuri Shimbun*, April 25, 2006.

¹⁶ U.S. Department of Defense, *2004 Statistical Compendium on Allied Contributions to the Common Defense*.

¹⁷ Reference material, “Anzenhosho Yogo Kaisetsu [Explanation of Security Terminology],” *Gaiko Foramu [Foreign Diplomacy Forum]*, January, 2005, p. 75.

24.9 billion yen, a 1.5% reduction from the fiscal 2007 budget amount. In addition, the U.S. and Japanese governments are to conduct comprehensive reviews in order to achieve more efficient and effective sharing of costs for U.S. forces stationed in Japan.¹⁸

From the outset, this problem of the cost of stationing troops is also an outcome of the asymmetry inherent in the Japan-U.S. treaty structure involving cooperation regarding things and people.¹⁹ However, as a result of that, the U.S. receives the largest sum of fiscal support in the world from Japan. Considered in terms of Table 1 also, in order to station U.S. forces offshore, there are some countries in which the U.S. has to develop bases while overcoming the opposition of local residents, shouldering the costs of stationing troops and paying large fees itself to utilize land. Compared to those nations, it would not be surprising for the U.S. to welcome the conditions it has for stationing its troops in Japan.

Table 1 Situation Regarding Sharing of Costs in Nations in which U.S. Troops are stationed

Segment	Japan	South Korea	Germany	Italy	U.K.
Base rental	Japan contributes	South Korea contributes small amount	U.S. contributes	U.S. contributes	U.S. contributes
Lighting, heating water, etc	*1 Japan contributes	U.S. contributes	U.S. contributes	U.S. contributes	U.S. contributes
Deployment of facilities	*1 Japan contributes	Both South Korea and U.S.	U.S. contributes	U.S. contributes	U.S. contributes
Labor cost burden	*1 Japan contributes	Both South Korea and U.S.	*2 U.S. contributes	U.S. contributes	U.S. contributes

*1 As a general rule contributed by the Japan side but limits are set on the coverage.

*2 The German side is covering the compensation paid to workers who lose their jobs when the stationed forces withdraw.

(Source: U.S. Department of Defense, *2004 Statistical Compendium on Allied Contributions to the Common Defense*, and Ministry of Finance Japan's Budget Bureau.)

(3) The relationship between threat awareness, deterrence and Japan's burden


The key to the realignment of U.S. forces in Japan is the threat awareness of the U.S. and Japan, the deterrence needed to counter that, and Japan's burden. Figure 1 shows the relationship between the U.S. deterrence that Japan deems necessary (Line T) and the deterrence actually provided to Japan by U.S. armed forces (Line D). The deterrence Japan deems necessary and the deterrence provided to Japan by the U.S. armed forces are determined to be something that can be approximated using the scale of U.S. forces in Japan as a representative variable. The horizontal axis represents the intensity of the threat and the vertical axis represents the level of deterrence (in other words, the scale of U.S.

¹⁸ "Zainichi Beigun Churyu Keihi futan ni tsuite [Regarding the sharing of costs for U.S. forces stationed in Japan]," Ministry of Defense website, <http://www.mod.go.jp/j/defense/US_keihi/tokukyou.html>.

¹⁹ National Diet Library, "Nihon no toumen suru Gaikoboue Bunya no Shokadai – 2006 Nen Haru Ikou no Shuyo na Ronten [Various Issues Japan Face in the Diplomacy and Defense Sector – Main Points of Debate from Spring 2006 Onward]," *Chosa to Joho [Investigation and Information]*, No. 529, March 2006, p. 3.

forces in Japan). In the Figure, Line T's ordinate intercept is larger than that of Line D. This indicates that even if a significant threat does not exist in the vicinity of Japan, the U.S. is not providing enough military force to match the scale deemed necessary by Japan. Furthermore, Line D's gradient is steeper than that of Line T. This shows that as the threat increases the U.S. bolsters U.S. forces in Japan at a faster past than Japan feels is necessary. The lines intersect at Point P. Naturally, in some cases the positional relationship of Line T and Line D would be reversed, and depending on their ordinate intercepts and gradients the two lines may not intercept. Below we will consider a case in which Line T has a larger ordinate intercept than Line D and has a lesser gradient, as one example.

Figure 1 - Relationship between threat awareness, deterrence and Japan's burden




When Japan and the U.S.' threat awareness is in agreement (L1 indicates the threat level) and their views on the scale of U.S. forces in Japan needed to deter that also correspond, the point of interception is P (V1 indicates the scale of U.S. forces in Japan). However, in a case where the threat is considered to have increased (or declined), a divergence develops between the scale of U.S. forces in Japan that Japan considers necessary from the standpoint of maintaining a deterrent, and the actual scale of U.S. forces that are deployed (L2 or L3). Where stationing U.S. forces in Japan is concerned, the deterrence effect and the tangible and intangible burdens (sharing the stationing expenses, noise accompanying training, constraints on private-sector activity and so on) share an inextricably linked relationship. Consequently, the aforementioned divergence materializes as either an expansion in Japan's burden (in the case of L2) or a reduction (in the case of L3).²⁰

Nevertheless, as Figure 2 shows, in a case where changes in the environment bring changes in the scale of U.S. forces in Japan that Japan deems necessary for the threat level, Line T shifts up or

²⁰ This model ignores the benefits resulting from economic activity from U.S. forces in Japan. (This is because Japan's U.S. forces procure their equipment from the U.S. and Japan carries the burden of facilities, labor, and lighting and heating costs).

down. Specifically, in a case in which the SDF is upgraded and becomes able to take on some of the deterrence that has been provided thus far by the U.S. forces in Japan, Line T shifts downward (Line T'). If the U.S. also rates the SDF's improvements highly and changes its ideas on deploying its forces in Japan accordingly (Line D'), even if Japan and the U.S. are aware that the threat has not changed (L1), the point of intersection moves to P1 and the scale of U.S. forces in Japan contracts to V1'.²¹ However, in a case where the U.S. forces do not take the state of the SDF's upgrade into account and keep the scale of their presence in Japan as it is, then a gap develops between Japan and the U.S. concerning the scale of U.S. forces in Japan considered appropriate.

Figure 2 - Relationship between threat awareness, deterrence and Japan's burden



Conversely, as Figure 3 shows, in a case where the U.S. armed forces believe it is possible to reduce the scale of their presence in Japan via transformation and realignment, Line D shifts downward to Line D'. In this case also, if Japan evaluates the transformation and realignment of U.S. forces in Japan and reconsiders the scale of U.S. forces needed for the deterrence that it deems necessary, then Line T shifts to Line T''. As a result, a new intersection point is formed at P1' and even if the threat level remains the same at L1, by reducing the scale of U.S. forces in Japan from V1 to V1'' the agreement of both Japan and the U.S. is reached. In this case, because the scale of U.S. forces in Japan declines, Japan's burden also declines in line with that.


What happens in the event that the elevation in deterrence brought on by the U.S. forces' transformation and realignment is not grasped accurately by Japan? Line D shifts to Line D', and Line

²¹ However, if a gap existed between Japan and the U.S. in terms of their assessment of the capabilities of an enhanced SDF, a gap in awareness would occur between Japan and the U.S. regarding the scale of U.S. forces in Japan that are needed.

T remains as it is. It is possible to interpret this as follows: Even if the threat level (shown by the horizontal axis) increases, because the U.S. forces' structure offers a more effective deterrent due to transformation and other developments, even at the same threat level, compared to before the scale of U.S. forces in Japan that is deemed necessary (shown by the vertical axis) declines (resulting in Line D shifting to Line D'). However, since awareness on the Japan side remains as it is, there is no change in the scale of U.S. forces that Japan considers necessary for a certain amount of threat (Line T is unchanged). However, the U.S. remains more sensitive than Japan in regard to an expansion in threat (the gradient of Line D' is steeper than the gradient Line T). Consequently, if the threat level increases the gap in awareness between the U.S. and Japan over the scale of U.S. forces needed contracts. And when the threat level reaches L4 (intersection point P2) the gap between the two parties disappears.²²

It is possible to express the relationship between threats, deterrence and Japan's burden simply like this, using market principles, because Japan and the U.S. have formed a relationship of interdependence.

Figure 3 - Relationship between threat awareness, deterrence and Japan's burden



3. Changes in the relationship of interdependence between Japan and the U.S.

(1) The decline in the U.S.' dependence on Japan and the decline in Japan's status to the U.S.

What sort of changes will a realignment of U.S. forces in Japan that reduces Japan's burden bring to the structure of the Japan-U.S. Alliance? The U.S. has found significance in its alliance with Japan

²² (3) is the result of joint analysis with the National Institute for Defense Studies' Keishi Ono, Chief, 3rd Research Office, Research Department.

as a result of having bases and stationing costs provided by Japan. The value of Japan's geopolitical position and the bases that are located there is high; Japan assumes a vital role in the U.S.' Asia strategy. At the same time, Japan receives a nuclear umbrella from the U.S. and is heavily reliant on the U.S. on the security front in terms of deterring and defending against threats. In particular, the reason why this awareness has been instilled in Japanese people is said to lie in the Standard Defense Force Concept that has been adopted as the basis for Japan's defense policy. Some have observed that while the Standard Defense Force Concept sought to limit defense capability out of domestic considerations – namely, budget and public opinion – it ended up increasing the importance of the Japan-U.S. security relationship and as a result formed an “incentive to become dependent on the U.S.”²³ Nevertheless, it can be said that Japan and the U.S. have a mutually dependent relationship in their security structure that is based on their alliance. And as a result, even if Japan came up for criticism from the U.S. regarding how it was contributing to the alliance, as long as the U.S. requires Japan's bases and its support with stationing costs, labor, technology and so on, the U.S. possesses the weakness of having to depend on Japan and this is conversely Japan's strength. At the same time, in its alliance relationship with the U.S., Japan has a constant “fear of being swallowed up” as well as a “fear of being discarded,”²⁴ and it cannot be denied that this fear of being discarded that arises from the alliance dilemma has exerted considerable influence on Japan's buildup of defense capabilities.

Following the 1,000 nautical mile sea lane defense promise and the formation of the Japan-U.S. Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement (1983) that exempted the U.S. from the Three Principles of Arms Exports, Japan has taken part in research in the SDI (Strategic Defense Initiative) at the request of the U.S., abolished its one percent of GDP limit on defense spending, and created a medium-term defense buildup plan (1985) that includes the purchase of Aegis-equipped destroyers and 100 P-3C anti-submarine patrol aircraft. In all cases it can be seen that this was made possible against the backdrop of the fear of being discarded.²⁵

That is to say, because both Japan and the U.S. have strengths and weaknesses the equilibrium of their alliance has been preserved. However, the U.S.' military transformation and realignment of its forces in Japan will probably bring changes of some sort to this relation of interdependence. As previously stated, Japan has provided bases and contributed to stationing costs, and this has been Japan's strength in the Japan-U.S. relationship. However, the realignment of U.S. forces in Japan will weaken this strength of Japan's and create a concern that the balanced structure may be disrupted. This is because whatever the strategic backdrop may be, while a reduction in the U.S. military bases means a reduction in Okinawa's burden, this will result in a weakening of the U.S.' degree of dependence on Japan. U.S. military bases in Japan perform a hub role and it is possible to interpret this as meaning Japan's importance has been emphasized as a result, but the withdrawal of U.S. military bases and troops will reduce Japan's burden and lead to a weakening in the U.S.' dependence on Japan.

Generally, a lesser degree of dependence would be a source of power to the dependent nation. This is because between two mutually dependent parties, if one party's degree of dependence is less

²³ Koji Murata, “Boei Seisaku no Tenkai – Gaidorain no Sakutei wo Chushin ni [The Development of Defense Policy - Focusing on Guideline Formulation],” *Kiki no Nihon Gaiko – 70 Nendai (Nenpo Seijigaku 1997)* [*The Crisis of Japan's Foreign Diplomacy in the 1970s – Political Science Annual 1997*], (Iwanami Shoten, 1997), p. 85.

²⁴ Glenn H. Snyder, “The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics,” *World Politics*, Vol. 36, No. 3, 1984, pp. 461-495.

²⁵ Jitsuo Tsuchiyama, *Anzenhosho no Kokusai Seijigaku – Aseri to Ogori* [*The International Politics of Security – Impatience and Arrogance*] (Yuhikaku Publishing, 2004), p. 314.

than that of the other party, as far as both parties consider the relationship of interdependence to be important, the source of power will lie with the party with the lower degree of dependence.²⁶ This sort of interdependent relationship, as previously described in Figures 1 to 3, behaves the same way as market principles. As Adam Smith pointed out in *The Wealth of Nations*, division of labor is a fundamental principle that enhances wealth, and the human nature of trading a certain item for another item and exchanging it, in other words the “propensity to exchange,” encourages the division of labor.²⁷ Like the market, the Japan-U.S. Alliance arises out of the mutual exchange of desired items. Accordingly, the weakening in dependence toward Japan will be advantageous to the U.S. position in Japan-U.S. relations outside of security, such as diplomatic negotiations and economic negotiations, and the breadth of its concessions in negotiations can be expected to contract. As has been noted, “The consequences of the transformation conversely lie more in the sphere of diplomacy and politics than they do in the sphere of military affairs,”²⁸ indicating that the realignment of U.S. forces in Japan is also likely to have an impact on the diplomatic and economic sectors.

For example, the relationship of superiority and inferiority between the two nations that began with the Japan-U.S. textile negotiations in 1970 have been linked to security. When the U.S.-Soviet détente approached its peak in the early half of the 1970s, the Saigon administration collapsed and there were reports of moves to withdraw U.S. forces stationed in South Korea. As a result, concerns mounted that Japan would be the next to be discarded.²⁹ The dumping of Japanese textiles, steel, televisions, machine tools, automobiles, semiconductors and other goods at this time and the liberalization of agricultural products in the 1980s were focused on as problems, and as if in combination with this the U.S. began asking Japan to undertake burden sharing in security. At the end of the Cold War the U.S.’ negotiating capabilities strengthened in relation to a problem over the FSX next-generation support fighter aircraft and the Structural Impediments Initiative (SII), and the U.S. went so far as to interfere with Japan’s domestic economic structure. In the background to the U.S.’ tough attitude was the weakened Soviet threat, which meant the U.S. no longer needed to pay attention to security to such an extent that it had to depend on Japan.

Meanwhile, because Japan still had to rely on the U.S. for security, when a Japan-U.S. trade problem looked set to surface in 1990 Japan was forced to make concessions in an attempt to prevent its security from being weakened.³⁰ From 1985, the U.S.’ tendency to use this approach gained traction, and Japan’s compliance with the liberalization of leather products, a semiconductor agreement and the liberalization of oranges and beef were all to a greater or lesser extent for fear of sanctions or threat under Section 301 of the Trade Act.³¹

Robert L. Rothstein explains that “In an alliance relationship between a large nation and a small nation, from the outset intrinsic imbalances exist in various issues in terms of maintaining and

²⁶ Joseph S. Nye, Jr., (translated by Akihiko Tanaka and Koji Murata), *Kokusai Funso – Riron to Rekishi, (Gensho Dai 4 Han) [Understanding International Conflicts: An Introduction to Theory and History, (Fourth Edition)]*, (Yuhikaku Publishing, 2003), p. 251.

²⁷ Adam Smith, (translated by Hyoe Ouchi), *Kokufuron [The Wealth of Nations]* (Iwanami Bunko, 1956), pp. 21-52.

²⁸ Kurt M. Campbell & Celeste Johnson Ward, “New Battle Stations?,” *Foreign Affairs*, September/October 2003, p. 96.

²⁹ Jitsuo Tsuchiyama, *Anzenhosho no Kokusai Seijigaku [The International Politics of Security – Impatience and Arrogance]*, p. 313.

³⁰ Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *Kokusai Funso [Understanding International Conflicts]*, p. 251.

³¹ Akihiko Tanaka, *Atarashii ‘Chuusei’ [The New Middle Ages]* (Nihon Keizai Shimbun Sha, 1996), p. 125.

preserving the alliance. While the small nation demands debate as an absolute right, the large nation seeks to decide the degree of debate according to the small nation's capacity to contribute when it comes to actual problem solving."³² If the scale of U.S. military bases in Japan contracts and the U.S.' degree of dependence on Japan decreases, Japan's ability to negotiate with the U.S. would be expected to decline.

(2) Realigning U.S. forces with the goal of reducing dependence on allied nations

Accompanying the end of the Cold War, George F. Kennan argued that the U.S. should reduce its offshore involvement.³³ In addition, the U.S.' traditional offshore balancing – whereby the balance of power within regions is left to the nations making up the region, with the U.S. intervening only when the balance cannot be maintained – also came to be revisited as a grand strategy. This strategy involves boosting nuclear weapons and the power of long-range mobility, and withdrawing U.S. forces from offshore bases, enabling the U.S. to make itself safer while not relinquishing regions of vital importance to large, rival nations.³⁴ Possibly due to the influence of this point of view, the U.S.' military transformation and the GPR also aim to reduce dependence on allied nations. Following the Transformation Planning Guidance,³⁵ in which the U.S. government ordered each of the armed forces to create a roadmap for reform every year, the U.S. Air Force is exhibiting the concepts of global mobility and global strike. The former means to “launch an operation anywhere in the world in the minimum time” and the latter means to be able to strike “an important target” within a number of hours or a number of minutes, wherever that target may be in the world. As a result of progress with innovative military technologies, demonstrable improvement is occurring in information-gathering capacities, troop mobility and the might and accuracy of fire power.

However, the most important point of all is that technological progress such as this will diminish the value of offshore bases and the degree of dependence on them. Among adherents to the revolution in military affairs, many believe that once it is possible to attack potential enemies around the world from the U.S. mainland or ocean, offshore bases will be unnecessary. For example, even if a change in the political climate saw an allied nation suddenly deny the U.S. the use of bases, if it were possible to immediately project military strength from the U.S. mainland to locations in which forward-deployed forces were not present the impact would not be major.³⁶ In fact, at the time of the Iraq War, Turkey denied the U.S. military the use of bases and Austria denied the U.S. military passage through its airspace, and these experiences are a strong motivator for reviewing approaches

³² Robert L. Rothstein, *Alliance and Small Powers* (Columbia University Press, 1968), pp. 57-58.

³³ George F. Kennan, *Around the Cragged Hill: A Personal and Political Philosophy*, (New York: W.W. Norton, 1993), p. 183.

³⁴ Christopher Layne, “From Preponderance to Offshore Balancing: America's Future Grand Strategy,” *International Security*, Vol. 22, No. 1 (Summer 1997) pp. 86-124.; Stephen M. Walt, *Taming American Power: The Global Response to U.S. Primacy*, (W. W. Norton & Company, New York, 2005), pp. 222-223.

³⁵ Takeshi Fukuda, “Beigu no Henkaku to Gurobaru Posucha Rebyu (Zaigaiibeigun no Saihen) [The Reform of the U.S. Forces and the Global Posture Review (The Realignment of U.S. Forces Offshore)],” *Reference*, June 2005, p. 71. Quoted from Transformation Planning Guidance, April 2003, p. 14. Quoted from http://www.oft.osd.mil/library/library_files/document_129_Transformation_Planning_Guidance_April_2003_1.pdf.

³⁶ Ibid. Quoted from United States Air Force, “The U.S. Air Force Transformation Flight Plan 2004,” pp. 42-45.

to offshore bases.³⁷ Regarding the issue of realigning U.S. forces, Richard Hawley, a retired U.S. Air Force general who makes proposals on approaches to the Air Force's military strength in the Asia-Pacific region, says the reason Guam is an important operation base is that "In the Iraq War [the U.S.] was unable to get permission from Turkey to use bases and this proved a hindrance to constructing an Iraq northern front, but political problems do not arise in the U.S. territory of Guam."³⁸ Furthermore, the high cost of stationing troops offshore and improving the working conditions of military personnel who have to live away from their families for long periods are issues that the U.S. military needs to resolve quickly.

Going forward, progress in military technology is likely to become an alternative means for compensating for the withdrawal of bases. The "sea basing" being pursued by the Navy and Marine Corps is one such example. A sea base involves viewing a ship positioned on the coast like a base on land, with an attempt to utilize it not only for support for ground offensives and troop landings, but also as a supply point and as a place for repairing equipment, massing and training troops, and other uses.³⁹ The advantage of sea bases is that they are safer than land bases and are not restricted by political and diplomatic restraints, thus allowing the U.S. military to function independently. The goal of reducing dependence on forward-deployed bases forms a backdrop to this concept also.⁴⁰

With modern threats it is not possible to specify beforehand the regions in which conflicts are likely to occur. In order to deal with this situation, the U.S. military prepares for various contingencies and regardless of where in the world a conflict looks set to break out it must be able to deploy military force there rapidly. The goal of the military transformation and the GPR can be perceived as boosting the readiness of military forces to prepare for unforeseen situations. This indicates a fundamental change in forward-deployed bases and troops; their role could be said to be starting to shift and to center on a means of deploying rapidly to areas of conflict, not just on the defense of allied nations and neighboring regions.⁴¹

As a result of the abovementioned changes in the military, it is becoming possible to deploy troops rapidly and the need to station large forces offshore in advance – and the dependence on offshore bases – is gradually weakening. Once the concepts of global strike and sea basing become reality the goal of offshore bases for determent and containment will fade and they are likely to become nothing but relay points for projecting military force onto a conflict area smoothly.⁴²

(3) The complete withdrawal of U.S. forces stationed in Iceland

The GPR resulted in the U.S.' dependence on Iceland as an offshore base for U.S. forces being completely severed. Around 1,200 U.S. Air Force personnel had been stationed there since 1951 as

³⁷ *Mainichi Shimbun*, February 15, 2003. When U.S. military forces stationed in Germany were to advance south overland to attack Iraq, the U.S. government asked the Austrian government to permit their domestic passage. But Austria adopts a policy of neutrality, and consequently replied that it would be unable to permit the passage of foreign troops without appropriate conditions, such as a U.N. resolution.

³⁸ *Yomiuri Shimbun*, July 6, 2003.

³⁹ Takeshi Fukuda, "Beigu no Henkaku to Gurobaru Posucha Rebyu (Zaigaibeigun no Saihen) [The Reform of the U.S. Forces and the Global Posture Review (The Realignment of U.S. Forces Offshore)]," *Reference*, p. 72. Global Security, "Fleet Response Plan," pp. 56-63. Quoted from <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/frp.htm>

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 72. "Naval Transformation Roadmap 2003", p. 56. Quoted from http://www.oft.osd.mil/library/library_files/document_358_NTR_Final_2003.pdf.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p. 73.

⁴² *Ibid.*, p. 73.

per Iceland's defense arrangement with the U.S., but as a result of the GPR, on September 30, 2006 the Keflavik base for U.S. forces was closed and the last U.S. forces withdrew from Iceland. Iceland is a member of NATO but does not possess its own military. However, Iceland, along with Greenland and Germany's Fulda Gap, had strategic value to NATO as a good location for defending trade routes in the Atlantic Ocean. Consequently the troop deployment centered on antisubmarine aircraft and fighter aircraft, but with the end of the Cold War the threat of the Soviet Union disappeared, and from 2001 Iceland held bilateral talks with the U.S. over the reduction of the U.S. forces stationed there. The withdrawal of U.S. forces was a traumatic event for Iceland, which up to then had followed a pro-U.S. path rather than a pro-Europe path, and it threw into doubt Iceland's trust of the U.S. and the continuation of Iceland's pro-U.S. foreign policy. Currently in Iceland's foreign policy more weight is being placed on Europe's importance, and the Icelandic government has decided to begin negotiating a defense agreement with the Norwegian government. The challenge for Iceland at the present point in time is whether it will be able to switch promptly from the pro-U.S.-centered line it followed thus far to a line that is closely coordinated with Europe. Iceland intends to continue to provide bases and financial outlays to NATO.⁴³

Previously, U.S. President Richard M. Nixon sought to make Japan share the burden of the Asia defense obligation, and in line with that to greatly reduce the U.S. military's forward-deployed forces in Asia, in other words U.S. military forces in Japan. As a measure for plugging the resulting gap he attempted to gain acceptance for the nuclear armament of Japan.⁴⁴ We cannot deny the possibility that proposals to Japan such as this will be revived in the future, once military technology and sea basing progress.

Going forward, if the value of bases in Japan is expected to decline, then covering the cost of stationing U.S. forces in Japan will become the only method of securing the Japan-U.S. Alliance. As long as Japan covers the stationing costs its status with the U.S. will be preserved. Conversely, if Japan stops offering or reduces the stationing support, this would be expected to weaken its position and undermine the U.S.' trust.

4. Strengthening the alliance relationship and maintaining balance in the relationship of interdependence

(1) Balance in the relationship of interdependence and the reasons for it

If the argument of advocates of the fortification of America, which opposes the stationing of U.S. forces offshore, grows stronger,⁴⁵ and if progress is made in the military technology needed to make that possible, then the U.S.' dependence on Japan will decline, since Japan will no longer be able to offer bases and stationing costs. Or, the U.S. may allude to a withdrawal of bases and utilize this as a tool in diplomatic and economic negotiations.

However, changes in the international security environment can be expected to create favorable

⁴³ Vakur Ingimundarson, "Iceland's Security Identity Dilemma: The End of a U.S. Military Presence," *The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs*, Vol. 31:1, Winter 2007, The Fletcher School, Tufts University, pp. 7-9.

⁴⁴ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan document, *Nikuson Ronbun – Betonamu Go no Ajia* [Nixon's Thesis – Asia After Vietnam], 1969 (Source: Richard M. Nixon, "Asia After Vietnam," *Foreign Affairs*, October 1967).

⁴⁵ Calder, [Embattled Garrisons], p. 311. Calder draws on the opinions of the Hudson Institute's William E. Odom and Robert Dujarric as advocates of the view that direct stationing of U.S. military forces offshore is unnecessary. A reference is *America's Inadvertent Empire* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004), which the pair jointly authored.

terms for Japan that cancel out this weakness and mean the balance in the relationship of dependence between Japan and the U.S. is for the time being preserved.

The first reason for this is that the U.S. is becoming unable to stand up to changing threats on its own. Even if military technology was achieved that meant forward-deployed bases were not needed, in order to deal with new threats such as international terrorism, piracy and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, political and diplomatic cooperation among a large number of countries has become essential. An emphasis on allied nations is stipulated even in the QDR 2006, and as this shows, the support of allied nations is vital in terms of the U.S.' security.

The second reason is that accompanying this, the Japan SDF's contribution of personnel on the military front, including missile defense, has become an urgent matter. In a situation such as the one that existed in the Cold War, where there was a standoff in the U.S.' and Soviet Union's nuclear strategies, the opportunities that a non-nuclear power like Japan had for contributing to the U.S.' military strategy were limited. Now, however, the SDF has come to be able to contribute directly to the U.S.' security, including missile defense and refueling missions in the Indian Ocean. The contribution of people in the alliance is making up for shortfalls in terms of bases and stationing costs.

Thirdly, the improvement of the relationship between Japan and China will act as leverage in Japan's relationship with the U.S. Until now the U.S. has been Japan's biggest market. An enormous trade deficit with Japan developed in the U.S., but the fact that the U.S. is a massive market for Japan increased Japan's dependence on the U.S. economically, and this was also a strength for the U.S. Now, however, China has replaced the U.S. as Japan's largest trading partner.

According to provisional statistics of trade on a customs clearance basis for 2007 published by the Ministry of Finance Japan on January 24, 2008, the value of Japan's trade with China, excluding Hong Kong, was just under 28 trillion yen (total value of exports and imports), and the value of Japan's trade with the U.S. was some 25 trillion yen, meaning the value Japan's trade with China exceeded the value of its trade with the U.S. for the first time on a calendar year basis.⁴⁶ In other words, because Japan has the option of trading not only with the U.S. but with China, its economic dependence on the U.S. has declined. In the Cold War the only option was to side with either the West camp or the East camp, but now, because Japan's dependence on China, Russia and other nations has deepened and is not limited to the U.S., it has become possible to use this as leverage in diplomacy with the U.S. Naturally, the U.S. also has the same options, and China is a major market for it.

In a Japan-U.S. joint public opinion poll conducted by the Yomiuri Shimbun in December 2006 and 2007, respondents were asked: "Of the U.S. and China, which do you think will be more important to Japan on the economic front from here on?" 62.2 percent (2006) and 61.5 percent (2007) cited China as important, compared to 24.5 percent (2006) and 22.6 percent (2007) who cited the U.S. By comparison, when Americans were asked "Of Japan and China, which do you think will be more important to the U.S. on the economic front from here on?" 35.8 percent (2006) and 22.6 percent (2007) cited Japan as important, compared to 55.7 percent (2006) and 49.3 percent (2007) who cited China.⁴⁷ Both Japan and the U.S. are emphasizing China on the economic front but the degree of emphasis is greater for Japan than it is for the U.S. This indicates that in economic negotiations Japan will not be unilaterally intimidated by the U.S. as happened at the time of Japan-U.S. economic

⁴⁶ Ministry of Finance, Japan's Foreign Trade Statistics, http://www.customs.go.jp/toukei/latest/gaiyo2007_12.pdf.

⁴⁷ "Nichibei Kyodo Yoronchosa [Japan-U.S. Joint Public Opinion Poll]," *Yomiuri Shimbun*, December 16, 2006 and December 14, 2007.

friction in the 1980s. Instead, because of China, Japan's dependence will become relative.

The fourth reason is that the U.S.' national prowess is in relative decline. The realignment of the U.S. military can be interpreted as a sign of a decline in the U.S.' national strength. This is because the U.S. will have to expend tremendous energy politically and fiscally to regain a military front once it has retreated from it. Given that it is withdrawing regardless, one can surmise that contrary to military rationality it no longer has the national strength to maintain its forward-deployed capabilities. Pulling back bases to the rear is comparatively easy but deploying new bases forward is difficult even militarily. When considered from a military standpoint, the fact that it has ventured to do this suggests the U.S. has adopted a passive stance.

President of the Council on Foreign Relations Richard Haass says "The era in which one nation maintains supremacy in a certain region and monopolizes power will end. The U.S.' unipolar control structure is ending and the world is beginning to step into an era of disorder."⁴⁸ The new era is likely to be a complicated time, crowded with many nations, companies, government-affiliated funds, international institutions and terrorist organizations.⁴⁹

In the past, the British Empire boasted prosperity just as the present U.S. does, but it too is undertaking large-scale military reform accompanying its national decline. For the British Empire, offshore naval bases were essential for colonial rule and for building trade networks in territories around the world, but there was also a financial burden to maintaining this. At the end of the 19th Century the British Empire found itself unable to independently protect its own interests, which stretched worldwide, as its relative economic prowess declined and industrialization caught on in other nations. As a result, the U.K.'s interests in the Far East were protected through dependence on the Japan-U.K. alliance. In addition, by acknowledging the U.S.' superiority on the American continent, the decentralization of the U.K.'s military resources was averted.⁵⁰

John Arbuthnot Fisher, who was appointed as First Sea Lord in 1904, conducted a reform of the Royal Navy in the British Empire, which was steadily in decline. Fisher's reform was wide-ranging and included naval yards, wages, personnel and training systems, but at the core was the consolidation of Royal Navy bases spread around the world, to concentrate the U.K.'s war-waging capability in the sea areas surrounding the British mainland. In other words, protecting the British mainland was made the priority issue in naval strategy, not protecting the Empire.⁵¹

As a result of the rise of China, the revival of Russia, the consolidation of Europe and similar developments, the U.S. too, which for around 20 years after the Cold War essentially enjoyed hegemony in terms of its military, economic, political and cultural strength, has seen the difference in its national power with those nations' power grow more equal. Although the background to the decline may differ, the U.S.' military reform and the GPR also were born out of the same process as that

⁴⁸ Richard N. Haass, "The Age of Nonpolarity," *Foreign Affairs*, May/June 2008, pp. 44-56.

⁴⁹ *Nihonkeizai Shimbun*, December 12, 2007.

⁵⁰ Masayuki Tadokoro, "Roiyaru Neivuii to Igrisu Gaiko [The Royal Navy and English Diplomacy]," Masayuki Tadokoro, ed., *Roiyaru Neivuii to Pakusu Buritanika [The Royal Navy and Pax Britannica]* (Yuhikaku Publishing, 2006), pp. 11-12; Kenneth Bourne, *The Foreign Policy of Victorian England, 1830-1902*, (Oxford University Press, 1970), pp. 169-175.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, p. 20.

of the British Empire.⁵² Just as the British Empire had no choice but to compromise with various forces, at present the U.S. is in a situation in which it must to a certain extent make concessions to its allies and compromise. Additionally, the emphasis on homeland security, and the consolidation and downsizing of U.S. military capabilities deployed around the world is also similar to the U.K.'s period of decline. For these reasons also, there is no question the U.S.' expectations toward its allies will continue for some time.

The fifth reason is that regardless of how much the U.S. progresses with military reform and boosts its forward-deployment projection capabilities, withdrawing its offshore bases and forward-deployed troops completely would not be in its best interests. James L. Jones, USMC Commander, United States European Command, points out that the advantage of forward deployment is not only that it makes it possible to project military force immediately, but also that it signifies the U.S.' commitment and deters potential challengers, as well as promoting regional stability via security cooperation within regions.⁵³ In addition to these reasons, those people adhering to the so-called gradualist approach to offshore bases, beginning with O'Hanlon, support the continued existence of offshore bases for reasons such as maintaining air superiority, stationing ground forces offshore and securing safe ports.⁵⁴

In the December 2006 public opinion poll, 6.2 percent of American respondents said U.S. military forces in Japan should be beefed up, while 61 percent said they should be kept as they are.⁵⁵ Although priority is being placed on military power deployment that is mobile rather than static, even now it is not possible to disregard forward-deployed military force. Even if it were possible to have air and sea forces with high readiness and remote operational capability, the value of the Marines and the Army as static forces is high, as is obvious if one examines the period after the Iraq War. Furthermore, as a statement from Major General Henry C. Stackpole, who previously served as commander of the Marines stationed in Okinawa, shows,⁵⁶ it may be that the U.S. believes U.S. forces in Japan also perform a role as a "bottle cap" preventing the militarization of Japan. Viewpoints such as this suggest that the U.S.' strategy after World War II was the double containment of not only the Soviet Union but (West) Germany and Japan as well.⁵⁷ If that is the case, it is difficult to imagine the U.S. military going so far as to sacrifice that advantage to withdraw completely from Japan.

For the reasons cited above, the U.S. requires the cooperation of allied nations and even if it temporarily holds a superior position in the relationship of interdependence it would no doubt be unable to conduct diplomacy in such a way that it would disturb harmony with Japan. Furthermore, in the bargaining between Japan and the U.S., the U.S. side is currently in a detrimental situation. This is because the reduction in Japan's burden is manifesting itself in ways that are tangible, such as the reduction and relocation of U.S. military bases and the partial withdrawal of U.S. forces, but

⁵² The case of the U.S. differs from that of the British Empire, where the economy was the cause of the decline, and some point out that the U.S. may face political dysfunction. Fareed Zakaria, "The Future of American Power," *Foreign Affairs*, May/June 2008, pp. 18-43.

⁵³ Statement of General James L. Jones, USMC Commander, United States European Command before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Sep. 23, 2004, p. 8. <http://www.dod.mil/dodgc/olc/docs/test04-09-23 Jones.pdf>

⁵⁴ Calder, *[Embattled Garrisons]*, pp. 323-325.

⁵⁵ "Nichibei Kyodo Yoronchosa [Japan-U.S. Joint Public Opinion Poll]," *Yomiuri Shinbun*, December 16, 2006.

⁵⁶ "U.S. Troops Must Stay in Japan," *Washington Post*, March 27, 1990.


⁵⁷ Layne, "From Preponderance to Offshore Balancing: America's Future Grand Strategy," p. 90. "Double containment" is a phrase used by Wolfram Hanrieder. Wolfram Hanrieder, *Germany, Europe, and America*, (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1989).

it is not possible to make the maintenance or bolstering of deterrence tangible. These factors cannot be said to provide the U.S. with good terms when it comes to swaying the Japanese government or public opinion. In addition, the realignment of U.S. forces in Japan is an issue of vital importance to Japanese people, and Japan's domestic politics and the areas in which bases are located are heavily impacted. However, to U.S. citizens resident on the U.S. mainland it is a foreign issue, and furthermore, it is only one part in the realignment of the many U.S. military bases the U.S. has spread around the world.

For example, let us apply the general interpretation of the “two-level game” to the relationship between Japan and the U.S. in connection with the realignment of U.S. forces, as in Figure 4.⁵⁸ The point of compromise in ideal diplomatic negotiations is located at the midpoint where Japan and the U.S.’ mutual demands align, but because in diplomatic negotiations domestic politics also plays a part, it is necessary to take into consideration not only the country that is the negotiating partner but domestic issues as well. Consequently, the point of compromise becomes a place where small reciprocal concessions from both nations’ biggest demands have been made. In regard to the realignment of U.S. forces in Japan, the greater the interest of Japanese citizens and local people, the more the government has to pay attention to domestic politics, and as a result, as Figure 5 shows, in diplomatic negotiations the situation is such that without significant concessions from the U.S. a point of compromise will not be reached.

Based on factors such as this, even if Japan's strengths in the form of its provision of bases and stationing support diminish, as long as the U.S. still requires them, the balance in the relationship of interdependence between the U.S. and Japan will be maintained and a conclusion in which the U.S. occupies a superior position toward Japan will not be reached.


Figure 4 - Structure of negotiations between Japan and the U.S.



(Created by the author)

⁵⁸ In the two-level game model, reference has been made to International Politics I, a lecture by Professor Yoshinobu Yamamoto. (Lecture given at the Department of International Politics, Aoyama Gakuin University, 2007)

Figure 5 - Structure of negotiations in realignment of U.S. forces in Japan



(Created by the author)

(2) The future of bases and the relationship of interdependence

If the discussion thus far is gathered together it is possible to sum it up as in Figure 6. As long as the U.S. desires the continuation of U.S. military bases in Japan and the stationing of U.S. forces in Japan, and Japan also requires it, even if there is some movement due to the influence of the international environment and domestic politics and economics, the balance in the relationship of interdependence between Japan and the U.S. is likely to be preserved (Area I). Something bringing about a major change in that balance would not be beneficial to either nation. However, if in the future Japan requires the stationing of U.S. forces while the U.S. does not require U.S. military bases in Japan or the stationing of forces in Japan, or if it suggested that intention, Japan would likely be forced to make significant concessions in diplomatic or economic negotiations in order to restrain the U.S. (Area II). Conversely, if Japan became unable to tolerate its cost burden and the provision of bases even though the U.S. wished to station forces in Japan, or if the stationing of U.S. forces became impermissible as a result of strong anti-American sentiment or mounting arguments for autonomous national defense, then the U.S. would have to make significant concessions in other negotiations in order to remain in Japan (Area III). Also, in cases where both countries no longer needed to depend on each other, the Japan-U.S. Alliance would be dissolved. Japan would lose the U.S.' powerful deterrent and defense capability and the U.S. would lose Japan's stationing support and an important strategic spot geographically (Area IV).

Figure 6 - The future of U.S. forces in Japan and the relationship of interdependence between Japan and the U.S.

		Japan	
		Stationing of U.S. forces necessary	Stationing of U.S. forces unnecessary
U.S.	Stationing in Japan necessary	Provision of bases, sharing of stationing costs Provision of deterrence and defense I	Anti-U.S. sentiment grows, autonomous national defense arguments mount Substantial concessions in diplomatic and economic negotiations, payment of base rents III
	Stationing of U.S. forces unnecessary	Substantial concessions in diplomatic and economic negotiations, burden increases Progress in military technology, change in strategy, decline in national strength II	Dissolution of alliance, autonomous national defense, or seek (bilateral or multilateral) alliance with other country/countries Dissolution of alliance IV

(Created by the author)

Let us look at the advantages to be gained from changes in the relationship of interdependence between Japan and the U.S. when Figure 6 is expressed numerically, as in Figure 7. Area I shows the current Japan-U.S. relationship – although some burden is incurred, because both nations obtain something they need the balance to be preserved, a condition of Pareto optimality.⁵⁹ In other words, in the relationship shown in Area I, the U.S.’ military and economic might are both greater than Japan’s, but because Japan and the U.S. provide each other with the respective economic and military strengths in which they excel, it is possible to create a structure of division of labor and comparative advantage from which the maximum benefit can be obtained. This does not affect just Japan and the U.S. – it also has value as public “property” in the form of stability in Asia. Meanwhile, in Area II and Area III, although one party deems the other necessary the other party does not deem it necessary and so is able to obtain advantage with less burden. For example, in Area II, it is possible for the U.S. to draw forth more support from Japan and in Area III Japan can obtain the U.S.’ defense capability without shouldering the burden of high stationing costs. In Area IV neither party needs the other, and the burden on the other party disappears, but this represents a state of Nash equilibrium⁶⁰ in which both parties are disadvantaged; Japan loses the U.S.’ powerful deterrent capability, and the U.S. loses Japan’s support and an important strategic spot geographically. This is not rational for either Japan

⁵⁹ Pareto optimality indicates a condition in which it is not possible to expand one party’s advantages without eroding another advantage. It is a state in which if you make a different choice the other party loses.

⁶⁰ A Nash equilibrium is a situation in which for both sides, when the other party does nothing, a unilateral strategy change by this side does not improve the situation for this side. It is a situation in which if one’s home country moves or the other country moves it is disadvantageous.

or the U.S. and could not be described as a good situation.

In other words, from the viewpoint of the exchange of things and people in the Japan-U.S. Alliance, both Japan and the U.S. are in a prisoner's dilemma, and the individual advantages of the U.S. and Japan can be maximized in a situation where the other party is unilaterally dependant, while the advantages for the two countries overall are maximized when they are mutually dependent.

Figure 7 - The future of U.S. forces in Japan and the relationship of interdependence between Japan and the U.S.

		Japan	
		Stationing of U.S. forces necessary	Stationing of U.S. forces unnecessary
U.S.	Stationing in Japan necessary	<div> <div>3</div> <div>3</div> <div>Pareto optimality</div> <div>I</div> </div>	<div> <div>4</div> <div>1</div> <div>III</div> </div>
	Stationing of U.S. forces un-necessary	<div> <div>1</div> <div>4</div> <div>II</div> </div>	<div> <div>0</div> <div>0</div> <div>Nash equilibrium</div> <div>IV</div> </div>

(Created by the author)

Relations between Japan and the U.S. deteriorated most when economic and trade friction grew pronounced in the early 1990s. At the time, the Clinton Administration was attempting to decide on a punitive tariff on Japan in connection with the issue of automobile exports, and the U.S. government tried to leverage the security relationship to win concessions from Japan on the trade front. However, Joseph Nye, who served as Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs in the Clinton Administration, opposed the idea, and made the U.S. government adopt policies that clearly segregated security and trade. This is because Nye believed that while a tactic of winning a superior position in trade via the U.S.' strength in security may be effective in the short term, if the same tactic were to be employed a number of times Japan may change its long-term strategy.⁶¹ Changeable economic activity may make it possible to avoid crises with a repetitious game and it may be possible to guide Pareto optimality and Nash equilibrium equally. But the alliance relationship is semi-fixed and it is not possible to conduct a repetitious game, so Nye undoubtedly forecast that once the

⁶¹ Charles W. Kegley, Jr. and Eugene R. Wittkopf, *American Foreign Policy: Pattern and Process, 5th ed.*, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996), p. 390.

relationship broke down, restoring it would be difficult.

Conclusion

For the U.S., whose national strength is thought to be in relative decline, the cooperation and support of allied nations is becoming increasingly vital, and even if Japan's provision of things decreased, for the time being it would not be likely to bring major changes to the Japan-U.S. relationship. As long as the U.S. needs bases offshore and Japan provides bases and stationing support the balance in the interdependent relationship between Japan and the U.S. will be maintained. Even if military technology that renders offshore bases unnecessary is achieved in the future, as long as Japan continues to support the U.S. it would not be in the U.S.' best interests financially or strategically to rashly relinquish that support, and the U.S. must not forget that interdependence in global security through the continued existence of offshore bases is closely connected to stability in the financial system and trust in the alliance.⁶²

Meanwhile, if the U.S. itself chose to withdraw completely from offshore bases in the future due to a lack of finances, a change in foreign strategy, or progress in military technology, and if Japan continued to be dependent on the U.S. for security as before, unless Japan possessed a method for contributing to the U.S. in place of bases and stationing support, Japan's status to the U.S. would undoubtedly decline. At that point Japan would probably be forced to make a choice: concede to the U.S.' demands in order to obtain security, or dissolve the Japan-U.S. Alliance and take the plunge with autonomous national defense, or build a new alliance structure. Whether or not it would be wise for Japan to try to possess a defense capability that ranked with the U.S.' and would be an alternative to the U.S.' nuclear umbrella is an issue that will have to be examined more and more from here on. At the same time, Japan must be vigilant in its efforts to make the U.S. aware that this would not be the optimum choice for the U.S., either. Regardless, ensuring security without incurring a burden is not possible.

⁶² Calder, *Embattled Garrisons*, p. 330.